This paper examines how civilian defense militias shape violence during civil war. Civilian defense forces are a sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militia that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign. We argue that civilian defense forces reduce the problem of insurgent identification, leading to a reduction in state violence against civilians. However, we also claim that these actors undermine civilian support for insurgents, which leads to an increase 
. The ÒSonsÓ offer a pertinent example of a civilian defense force, a unique form of pro-government militia. These groups are composed mainly of civilians who undertake intelligence and limited combat roles to extirpate insurgents from their community. In comparison, other militias are often more mobile, composed of a wider range of recruits (e.g. ex-servicemen, criminals, conscripts), and undertake a variety of different roles (e.g. offensive operations, election agitation, private security). Between 1981 and almost a quarter of the 83 states that mobilized a pro-government militia delegated some responsibility to a civilian defense force. From Iraq to Colombia, Angola, and the Philippines, civilian defense forces are a regular feature of civil war. However, despite the frequency with which they operate, empirical research has yet to develop a sufficient understanding of how civilian militias affect civil violence.
We argue that since civilian defense forces contain members of the local population, they possess unique knowledge of the people within the communities in which insurgents and their sympathizers hide. This local knowledge allows the militias and their state patron to more effectively and selectively target insurgents. However, using civilians to identify insurgents provokes a response from the rebels, who retaliate by targeting the local population to deter future defections and re-establish control. This drives a wedge between insurgents and the local population, increasing rebel violence against civilians. More effective incumbent targeting, increased rebel violence against civilians, and insurgent fragmentation triggered by the increasingly hostile environment lead to more deadly civil war.
We test our arguments with a nested mixed method research design (Lieberman 2005 ). We use a negative binomial regression model to analyze recently released data coding the presence of all militias operating globally between 1981 and 2005, and counts of civilian fatalities undertaken by rebel and government forces. Following LiebermanÕs Òmodel testingÓ small-N approach, we then offer a case analysis of civilian forces in Iraq.
We use this case to clarify our method of conceptualization and more convincingly rule out rival explanations (Lieberman 2005: 440-442) . Together, the results strongly support our claims.
We therefore offer important conceptual and empirical contributions to the growing collection of work centered on the effects of pro-government militias (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2015; Jentzsch, Kalyvas and Schubiger 2015; Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014; Schubiger 2012; Stanton 2015) . While most studies tend to examine state delegation of violence as a means to avoid accountability, we make broader claims about patterns of civil war violence. In so doing, we provide a contribution to emerging debates on insurgent defection, side-switching and splintering (e.g. Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012; Cunningham 2013 Cunningham , 2014 Staniland 2012 Staniland , 2014 . By highlighting the role of civilian collaborators in the maintenance of political order, we also speak to ongoing debates concerning the use of social networks in imperial conquest (e.g. Macdonald 2014) , as well as developing statesÕ governance strategies (e.g. Ahram 2011; Belge 2011; Holden 2004; Thomson 2011; Tilly 2003) . We show that while it is common to use civilians as a source of information on insurgents, doing so leads to increased insurgent targeting of civilians and more deadly civil conflicts.
From a policy-making perspective, this presents significant ethical implications for those considering implementing such divisive strategies. Supporting civilian militias increases incumbentsÕ ability to identify insurgents and establish control, but we suggest that incumbents need to protect civilian groups to offset the pernicious effects of placing them at the center of armed conflict.
The Effects of Pro-Government Militias
Pro-government militias are organized armed groups aligned with the government (national or subnational) but not identified as members of the conventional armed force (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe 2013: 250) . Most studies on the effects of militias focus on the relationship between pro-government militias and human rights violations. Informal militias (i.e. those not officially linked to the state) provide incumbents a means to off-load Òdirty workÓ and plausibly deny extreme methods used to target opponents and civilians (Campbell 2002: 13-14; Cohen and Nordas 2015; Huggins 1991) . Unofficial militia groups are therefore strongly associated with human rights abuses and civilian targeting (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell 2015; Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014; Raleigh 2012) .
Previous research reveals how militias support weak state institutions (e.g. Ahram 2011; Klare 2004: 120-121) . Militias offer incumbents governing weak institutional structures a cheaper method to engage insurgents (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2011: 6-7) .
In this way a stateÕs creation and/or collaboration with militias provides a non-traditional means of consolidating power (Ahram 2011: 14-15) . However, weak states often lack the ability to control militia violence (Barter 2013: 20; Mitchell, Carey and Butler 2014) .
Therefore, rather than violence occurring because states are unwilling to control militias, violence can also occur when the state is unable to exert sufficient control over a group (Mitchell 2004: 46-50) .
Finally, a third body of literature discusses the role that militias can play in assisting incumbents to overcome the Òidentification problemÓ (Kalyvas 2006: 108-109; Lyall 2010: 15) . The Òidentification problemÓ arises from the challenges of identifying insurgents within a civilian population (Galula 1964: 55-57; Kalyvas 2006: 89-91; Kilcullen 2010) . In the absence of reliable intelligence, incumbents must choose between inaction and the adoption of indiscriminate forms of violence (Kalyvas 2006: 147-149) . Given the obvious problems associated with inaction, a lack of reliable intelligence more commonly leads to indiscriminate violence. This approach is often counterproductive, as it alienates the very people the incumbent is attempting to win over to their side (Downes 2008) . Research suggests that militias can provide local information on insurgents that allows the state to apply violence more selectively (Kalyvas 2006: 107; McClintock 1992: 251-252; Peic 2014; Jones 2012: 15-17) .
Types of Pro-Government Militias
Despite highlighting key effects produced by pro-government militias, existing accounts fail to adequately distinguish between different types of militias and the unique roles they may perform. A lack of cross-national data has largely prevented the effective categorization of militia forces, and limited analysis of the effects associated with different forms of militia groups. One exception is the work of Carey, Mitchell and Lowe (2013: 251-253) , who distinguish between militias in relation to their link with the state, categorizing groups as either ÒinformalÓ or Òsemi-officialÓ. Mitchell, Carey and Butler (2014) draw on this typology, adopting a principal-agent framework to argue that groups informally linked to the state have a stronger negative effect on human rights violations.
However useful the informal/semi-official distinction, it does not tell how differences in factors such as the recruitment base and mode of operation can impact conflict processes. Examination of a broader range of factors, such as their relationship with rebel organizations (Barter 2013) , will enable a deeper understanding of the effects of militias. For instance, it is not clear why militias are better than conventional incumbent forces at separating the insurgents from civilians. Militias often have a similar membership composition and operational parameters as state forces (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013) .
Some groups comprise off-duty military or police, offering no distinct advantage for gaining information. Recent literature has made some in-roads in discussing pro-government militia heterogeneity, but has yet to delineate the varied nature of these actors and their impact on civil war dynamics (Ahram 2014; Barter 2013; Carey, Mitchell and Lowe 2013) . This paper seeks to contribute towards a better understanding of the impact pro-government militias have on civil war dynamics by focusing on the effects of one particular sub-set of militia, civilian defense forces.
Civilian Defense Forces
Civilian defense forces are a well-established type of pro-government militia in counterinsurgency thinking (Galula 1964: 82-94; Jones 2013: 15; Mclintock 1992: 247-249) and an increasingly recognized category amongst civil war scholars (Barter 2013; Fumerton and Remijnse 2004; Peic 2014) . This work highlights a number of clear criteria that help to define civilian defense forces. Firstly, they are recruited mainly from civilian populations.
Unlike non-civilian defense forces composed of off-duty policemen/military, ex-servicemen, or other conscripts with some level of military training, civilian defense forces are composed mainly of civilian groups from within areas contested by the incumbent and insurgent forces.
Secondly, such forces remain within their recruitment areas. Unlike mobile fighting forces that cross from one area to the next, they are static. This, along with their civilian status, means that recruits in civilian defense forces typically live in their own homes rather than reporting to a barracks. Thirdly, civilian defense forces perform ÒdefensiveÓ tasks. This means they also undertake intelligence, security, and limited combat roles concerned with the protection of their local areas from insurgents, both extirpating insurgents from their own communities and denying access to insurgents from outside. This differentiates civilian defense forces as we define them from militias that actively target a variety of opponents across wide areas, or groups who perform other roles within their local community that are not connected to an insurgency.
In sum, civilian defense forces are a form of pro-government militia that harnesses the active participation of civilians (and defected members of an insurgency) in a counterinsurgency effort taking up sedentary, defensive roles. Civilian defense forces are conceptually best contrasted to Òdeath squadÓ-style militias composed of military-trained personnel that operate according to military-style command structures, roaming large areas in active search of insurgents or other opponents, such as Òdeath squadsÓ in Latin American during the Cold War (see Table I ) (Mazzei 2009: 4-10) . We also conceptually contrast civilian defense forces from vigilante police forces due to the specific counterinsurgent role that defense forces take. Rather than identifying common criminals and cattle thieves or enforcing specific legal codes (such as sharia law), a civilian defense forceÕs role is primarily to defend the community from insurgents. Civilian defense forces are a historically common feature in irregular wars ranging from the Òcivil defense patrolsÓ in Peru and Guatemala to Turkish Village Guards and Filipino Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units.
Non-civilian defense forces vary considerably in their composition, operational parameters, and context and thus do not represent a single category. The multiple subcategories of non-civilian defense forces are beyond the scope of this paper. For instance, non-civilian defense forces operate in a variety of contexts with diverse operational parameters, ranging from personal guards, to security forces operating in non-civil war settings, such as the ÒXinjiang Production and Construction CorpsÓ which protected business interests in China, to military organized state-led groups such as the ÒWhite EaglesÓ, a Serbian militia responsible for various attacks during the dissolution of former Yugoslavia (Mitchell, Carey, and Lowe 2013) . In other words, while civilian defense forces exhibit particular characteristics in a counterinsurgent context, the non-civilian defense force category captures a variety of pro-government militias. 
Overcoming the Problem of Identification
Members of local communities generally know who individual insurgents are, or at least which residents are more likely to hide them. Militias formed of local residents and insurgent defectors are therefore able to readily identify local insurgents and those that support them (Kalyvas 2006: 107; Lyall 2010) . Other forms of militia, such as mobile informal groups, often operate away from their villages of origin and are thus not privy to inside information in the same way. Therefore the ability to reduce the problem of identification is unique to civilian defense forces. We see this as part of a wider effort on behalf of states to make their citizenry ÒlegibleÓ (Belge 2011) . In addition to this intelligence function, leveraging civilian defense forces inherently serves as a political tool to increase civilian support for the incumbent.
The formation of a civilian defense force is therefore likely to fundamentally alter state violence in civil war. Previous research shows that the nature (selective versus indiscriminate) of violence is a function of control and the access to information that this provides (Kalyvas 2006: 202-209) . According to this theory, as the level of control exerted by a belligerent increases, the likelihood that that actor will employ indiscriminate violence diminishes. Control is inextricably linked to the levels of support for that actor and the amount of information it has. As active and passive support for an actor increase, so do the chances for collaboration, such as through furnishing intelligence. Greater access to local knowledge through local militias enhances the stateÕs ability to selectively target their opponents and increase their control over local populations. Indeed, Peic (2014) shows that states employing civilian defense forces are more likely to defeat an insurgency, due to the local information they can provide. Thus by helping to reduce the problem of insurgent identification and enhancing levels of state control, we expect the presence of civilian defense forces to significantly decrease indiscriminate government-sided violence. From this discussion we derive our first hypothesis. 
The Wider Effects of Civilianizing Warfare
However, the advantages that an incumbent gains from the presence of civilian defense forces produce the opposite effect for insurgents. Civilian defense forces inherently oppose the rebels, reducing their ability to evade detection and maintain control of local populations. As incumbents persuade the civilian population to actively engage in actions against the insurgents (e.g. a security role, denying insurgents sanctuary and entering combat against them), they drive a wedge between the rebels and civilians. The defection of civilians from the insurgents to the incumbents diminishes insurgent control and increases the likelihood of indiscriminate insurgent violence (Kalyvas 1999: 269, 276; 2006: 224-226) . For as many studies on insurgent violence against civilians argue, faced with hostile civilians and a declining level of control, insurgents respond violently, employing more indiscriminate forms of violence where they have weaker levels of control (Downes 2007 (Downes , 2008 Eck and Hultman 2007; Raleigh 2012; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2010) . In other words, we expect that the incumbentÕs leveraging of a civilian defense force will produce an increase in insurgent attacks towards the civilian populations that no longer support them. This leads to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a civilian defense force increases indiscriminate rebel violence against civilians.
Delegating tasks to civilian groups can also polarize local communities, producing higher levels of violence as incumbents and insurgents seek to gain the active (rather than passive) support of the community. Civilians become participants in the civil conflict, actively supporting and collaborating with either the insurgents or the incumbents. Research indicates that in this environment people use these outlets to settle personal feuds, increasing inter-civilian violence and the overall number of fatalities (e.g. Kalyvas 2006: 376) .
In addition, a civilian defense force can reduce the cohesion of insurgent movements.
Faced with an incumbent that is better equipped to identify insurgents, and a population that is hostile to insurgent demands, the probability of insurgent defection is increased (Kalyvas 1999: 275-277) . As Staniland (2014: 40-49) argues, counterinsurgents are able to diminish insurgent cohesion by starving insurgents of local support and incentivizing side-switching to the incumbent cause. The possibility of side-switching poses a serious threat to the strength and stability of the insurgency, and requires the group to focus violent attention on actual and potential defectors within their organizations and supporting populations (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012; Lyall 2010; Staniland 2012) . Ethnic cleavages and other social networks pervading insurgent groups can exacerbate this process (Lyall 2010; Staniland 2014: 97) . In this way the emergence of civilian defense forces can turn the insurgency in on itself, increasing the use of violence within insurgent groups as well as towards its civilian support base (as in hypothesis 2).
In this respect, we argue that the initiation of a civilian defense force intensifies violence within civil conflict. The cumulative effect of the increased ability of incumbents to target insurgents, increased insurgent targeting of civilians, insurgent infighting, and the general process of civilianizing civil conflict, is likely to produce an increase in the violence overall. From this discussion we can derive our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The presence of a civilian defense force increases the overall fatalities during civil war.
Research Design
To test our hypotheses we apply a nested mixed-method research design (Lieberman 2005 ). We first assess our arguments using statistical analysis. Having completed the primary analysis we then follow LiebermanÕs ( 
Dependent Variables
To evaluate hypotheses 1 and 2 we examine data on the use of one-sided violence in civil conflict (Eck and Hultman 2007) . This data provides a count of (intentional and direct) killings of civilians by both government and rebel agents between 1989 and 2005.
1 The data 1 Using data at the yearly level of aggregation does have limitations. Often incidents of one-sided violence are not centrally planned and thus should perhaps theoretically be analyzed as individual forms of political violence (Schneider and Bussmann 2013) . However, disaggregation to the event level has the disadvantage of limited comparability and presents additional data challenges, not least the lack of geo-coded militia data (Raleigh 2012 
Independent Variable
To operationalize civilian defense forces we draw upon the pro-government militia database (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, 2013) . This cross-national database captures the presence of pro-government militias by applying a uniform coding scheme to publically available news sources. Pro-government militia is defined as Òa group that is identified by sources as pro-government or sponsored by the government (national or sub-national), that is not part of the regular security forces, is armed, and has some level of organizationÓ (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, 2013: 252) . The dataset identifies 331 pro-government militias active between 1981 and 2007. In addition to the raw data, the pro-government militia dataset is complemented by an online relational database that provides the primary news sources used to code the data. Using this material we code civilian defense forces as militia groups that meet the following coding criteria 5 :
(1) Participants: the group is composed mainly of civilians.
(2) Area of operation: forces remain within the neighborhood, village, or region/department from which they were recruited. Members remain in their own homes rather than reporting to a centralized operational base. For coding civilian defense forces within the existing database (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, 2013) we relied primarily on the online database news sources used to code the original data. On the rare occasions when we had insufficient information within the existing online database sources, we undertook additional research into the characteristics of the group using major news sources (e.g. BBC World Service, The Guardian). 6 We systematically reviewed all 331 entries for the 3 essential civilian defense force criteria. We only classified groups that met all three criteria as civilian defense forces. Given the relative clarity of coding criteria for civilian defense forces, identifying the requisite characteristics was straightforward in most cases. In total, 50 of the 331 pro-government militias met all three criteria and we coded each of these as civilian defense forces. 8 We capture the presence of a civilian defense force using a dummy variable, with all country years in which a civilian defense force was present coded as 1, and 0 in all other cases.
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Controls
We include a number of controls to account for potentially confounding variables and competing arguments. Firstly, we include indicators of key state characteristics that have been shown to influence the dynamics of civil violence. We expect that democracies are more prone to suffer rebel violence against civilians, whilst autocracies more likely to involve high intensity violence and government targeting of the civilian population. To account for this we include a measure of regime type taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2006) . The dynamics of violence within a state are also closely related to economic development. States with a stronger economic base are better equipped to protect their population from rebel assaults and less likely to require violence to gain civilian collaboration. To account for this we include a lagged indicator of GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002) . States that contain large populations and inaccessible terrain are more 8 For a full list of civilian defense forces see supplementary appendix III. For some descriptive analysis of key civilian defense force characteristics see supplementary appendix IV.
9 We follow the pro-government militia database and consider all militia forces that share a similar organization and political basis as part of the same group. This approach means that in more than 75% of cases there is only ever one civilian defense force operating within a state. As a robustness check we replaced our dichotomous independent variable for a count variable indicating the number if independent groups within a state, there is no significant difference in our results.
challenging to control, which could increase the likelihood of one-sided violence. We control for this relationship by including the natural log of the stateÕs population (Gleditsch 2002 ) and the logged percentage of mountainous terrain (Fearon and Laitin 2003) . Finally, we include an indicator of the size of a stateÕs excluded population (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010) . We expect higher levels of exclusion to increase all forms of violence.
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We also include controls to account for key conflict characteristics. Firstly, to ensure that our results are driven by civilian defense forces, and not pro-government militias more generally, we control for other militias that are Òinformally or Òsemi-officially linked to the state ). As we discuss above, other militias (e.g. non-civilian defense groups) can take a variety of forms. Yet in the absence of clear conceptual categories for other sub-sets of militia, controlling for other groups in relation to their link with the state offers the most theoretically meaningful method.
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We include an indicator of incompatibility, based on the belief that conflicts fought for control of the state are more often of a high intensity and involve civilian targeting. We include an indicator of conflict 10 We do not include country-fixed effects on account of the low level of within-case variation on our independent variable (e.g. 85% of conflicts in the dyadic dataset always or never feature a civilian force 11 We also run the analysis using a dichotomous variable to account for the presence of all other militia groups.
Our main findings remain consistent regardless of the approach adopted. We include the disaggregated measures of other militias as they offer additional theoretical insights.
duration that records the number of years since the start of the conflict episode. Over time we expect a reduction in all forms of violence. To capture the distribution of capabilities within a conflict we include a ratio of the number of all rebel forces operating within the stateÕs territory to the total number of government troops (Wood, Kathman and Gent 2012) . 12 We expect relatively stronger rebellions to increase the overall conflict severity, but have only a minor effect on the violence against civilians (Wood 2012) . We include the natural log of the total number of battlefield deaths in each conflict year (for the analysis of civilian deaths) (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005) as conflicts of a greater intensity might be more likely to involve violence against civilians. Further, we include the log-transformed count of civilian killings perpetrated by the opposing actor in each of the civilian violence models. We expect increased government or rebel violence to lead to an increase in their opponentÕs use of repressive force (Wood, Kathman and Gent 2012) . We also include our own measure to account for the presence of a peacekeeping operation that based on previous research we expect to reduce the use of all one-sided violence (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013) . Finally, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the conflict actor perpetrated one-sided violence in the previous year to account for potential problems of temporal dependence.
13

Statistical Analysis
12 For the analysis of rebel violence the ratio measures the individual rebel organization in relation to the number of government troops (Wood, Kathman and Gent 2012) .
13 See robustness checks for a number of alternative specifications.
We present the statistical results in Tables II, III and IV. As all three dependent variables are counts of fatalities we estimate negative binomial regression models. Table II includes the analysis that assesses hypothesis one (government violence), Table III, hypothesis two (rebel violence), and Table IV , hypothesis three (conflict intensity). All results support our hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 posited that the presence of civilian defense forces helps governments reduce the problems associated with insurgent identification. We argued that local civilian militia would increase the ability of the state to selectively target insurgents, lowering the use of indiscriminate violence against their civilians. The analysis provides strong support for this claim.
Model 1 assesses the effect of a civilian defense force on one-sided government violence whilst controlling for potentially confounding state characteristics. As expected, the civilian defense force variable is negative and statistically significant. This effect remains consistent when we add controls that account for the conflict context (Model 2). Moving to the second phase of analysis, hypothesis 2 predicted that the formation of civilian defense forces would increase rebel violence against civilians. We argued that insurgents are more likely to target civilians when they actively signal their collaboration with the state by forming a civilian defense force. The results depicted in Table III offer firm support for our claims. As with the prior analysis, we first assess the influence of civilian
14 Predicted values generated using the CLARIFY package in STATA 12 (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000) .
All control variables were held at their mean or modal values assuming that the actor perpetrated some form of one-sided violence in the previous year.
defense forces whilst controlling for state characteristics (Model 3). We then include additional controls to account for the conflict context (Model 4).
In all models the civilian defense force variable produces a positive and statistically significant effect on the use of rebel violence against civilians. As predicted by hypothesis 2, the presence of a civilian defense force appears to refocus the targets of insurgent violence, increasing the insurgentÕs incentives to target civilians. Substantively, the presence of a civilian defense force increases the predicted number of insurgent killings from 63 to 153, an increase of 143%. This effect is consistent across all specifications including both state and conflict controls.
The analysis also produces a number of findings that broadly support our theoretical claims. The intensity of one-sided rebel violence is lower within autocratic and economically strong states, and those that contain less inaccessible terrain. This suggests that states which are unfavorable to insurgency have lower levels of insurgent control and thus an increased likelihood of rebels targeting civilians indiscriminately.
Other control variables also perform in accordance with our expectations. High intensity civil conflicts, in particular those with a history of one-sided violence, are more likely to suffer intense levels of rebel violence. A more significant ÒexcludedÓ population increases the level of rebel violence, and conflict duration has a negative effect on insurgent violence. Informal militias again have the opposite effect to civilian defense groups, significantly reducing insurgent violence against civilians. This finding points to the inefficiency of state-sponsored attacks against civilians, for the violent actions of informal groups appear to reduce rebel reliance on violent methods to foster domestic support. The final hypothesis predicted that the presence of a civilian defense force would increase the overall fatalities in civil conflict. The combined effect of increased numbers of state-sided participants, more effective targeting of the insurgency, and ÒsofterÓ rebel civilian targets, we argued, increase the overall intensity of war. The results are presented in Table IV . As with the prior analysis, we first control for state characteristics (Model 5), and then include additional conflict controls in a fully specified model (Model 6). In both models a civilian defense force has a strong positive and highly significant effect on the number of battle-related fatalities. As expected, the delegation of security roles to a civilian defense force appears to significantly increase the severity of civil war violence. Substantively, the presence of a civilian defense force increases the predicted number of fatalities by 241%, rising from 220 to 751 predicted deaths.
The other significant analysis largely supports previous work. The relative strength of a rebel force is shown to have a positive effect on the intensity of civil conflict. Conflicts are more likely to assume a conventional nature and violent character when rebel forces grow to match the size of the state. As with the prior analysis, ÒexcludedÓ groups increase the overall intensity of a conflict, while a longer duration decreases the severity of the violence. Informal groups increase the overall fatalities in a civil conflict; presumably their broader range of targets, wider geographic focus, and more offensive remit inflame civil strife.
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Taken together, the results highlight the utility in disaggregating between forms of violence in civil war. As our theoretical discussion predicted, civilian defense forces produce quite different effects on government, rebel and overall civil violence. In line with previous literature, we find varied effects for a number of our controls. Informal militias, compared to civilian defense groups, have the opposite effect on one-sided violence,, significantly increasing government violence, but reducing insurgent violence against civilians. Militias that are semi-officially linked to the state do not have a significant effect on any form of violence. These groups tend to most closely approximate conventional armed forces, and it is therefore perhaps not surprising that conflicts involving semi-official groups are not clearly distinguishable from those involving only conventional forces. Democratic states are more likely to suffer rebel violence against civilians, whilst non-democratic states are more likely to undertake government-led violence. The nature of the regime has little effect on the overall conflict severity. Economic development decreases the likelihood of all forms of violence against civilians, but only significantly reduces rebel-led violence. A greater excluded population increases all forms of violence significantly. Mountainous terrain significantly reduces the likelihood of rebels targeting civilians, but has no real effect on any other form of violence. More generally we have shown that the relative strength of a rebel force has a positive effect on the intensity of civil conflict, but does not, however, produce a significant effect on the likelihood of either government or insurgent violence against civilians. This supports previous research that has shown that changing the balance of power within a conflict, rather than specific power configurations, is the key driver of civilian violence (Wood, Kathman and Gent 2012) . Increased conflict intensity is more likely to produce government and rebel targeting of civilians, but the effect is only significant for rebel violence. It appears that one-sided violence is not a reciprocal process, as neither government nor rebel violence has a significant effect on the intensity of their opponentÕs attacks. Increased conflict duration reduces the likelihood of all forms of violence. Finally, as we would expect, a history of rebel or government violence strongly increases the likelihood of the same actor subsequently targeting civilians.
Robustness Checks
To ensure that our results are robust we change a variety of model specifications and rerun the estimates.
16 Firstly, to ensure that we have not omitted any other key variables, we rerun our analysis including a number of additional controls that previous research suggests might influence the dynamics of civil violence. We add controls for: multiple rebel groups, democratic aid dependence, distance to the nearest democracy, the size of conflict area, ethnic fractionalization and the presence of natural resources. Our results remain robust in all model specifications.
Secondly, including a lagged dependent variable to account for temporal dependence can sometimes lead to inconsistent estimates (Achen 2000; Brandt and Sandler 2012) . To evaluate how robust our findings are against alternative estimation approaches, we rerun the analysis using (i) dummy variables to account for one-sided violence in the previous 2, 3, and 5 years; (ii) a count of fatalities in the previous 1, 2, 3 and 5 years; (iii) the ÒyearÓ variable to account for any linear time trend; (iv) year-fixed effects to account for a time trend and common shocks; (v) a count of the years since the last fatality (along with square and cubic terms); 17 finally, (vi) we removed all temporal controls. Our results are robust regardless of the method used to account for temporal dependence.
16 The data, replication materials, and output from all the robustness checks are available on the International Studies Quarterly Data Site -http://www.isanet.org/Publications/ISQ/Replication-Data, or from the authors website.
Thirdly, using the conflict/dyad year as the unit of analysis also increases the likelihood of a small selection of conflicts biasing the results. We therefore rerun the analysis excluding the most deadly civil conflict years. Our key findings are robust even when the most deadly years of civil conflict and civilian targeting are removed from the analysis.
18 However, taking yearly measurements of fatality counts over the course of a conflict also risks artificially reducing the standard errors by inflating the number of observations. To ensure that our findings are not biased in this manner, we assess the effect of civilian forces on one-sided violence across conflict episodes. 19 The results complement our prior analysis, suggesting that the presence of a civilian defense force during a civil war reduces the likelihood of the government targeting civilians, but increases the likelihood of one-sided rebel violence.
Finally, civilian defense forces could quite feasibly be the result rather than the cause of violent contexts. To account for potential endogeneity, we undertake matching to pair 18 For rebel violence we excluded DRC-AFDL (1996, 1997), Bosnia-Serbian Irregulars (1992 & 1995 , DRC-RCD (1998). For government violence we excluded Sudan (2004), DRC (1997 ), Rwanda (1994 , 1997 , Afghanistan (1998) . For conflict severity we excluded Congo-Cobras (1997), Angola-UNITA (1993), Ethiopia-EPRDF (1989 ), Ethiopia-Military Faction (1990 ), and Ethiopia-EPRDF (1990 .
19 Cases in which civilian defense forces were present in some but not all of the conflict years are challenging to assess using the conflict episode. To overcome this, we use a number of different measures, including a ratio variable capturing the number of years in which the militias were present relative to the total conflict years; a dummy variable indicating if a civilian defense force was in all, 75% or 50% of the conflict years; and a dummy variable indicting the presence of a civilian defense force at any point during the conflict. The effect is largely consistent across the different measures.
observations that featured a civilian defense force with similar observations without a civilian defense force. This process removes observations without civilian defense forces that have no analogue amongst the cases in which a civilian defense force was active. 20 By preprocessing our data in this manner we are able to assess the effect that civilian defense forces have independent of the conflict dynamics that might be more likely to produce such groups. We identify pairs using the MatchIt package in R, adopting 1:1 nearest neighbor matching with replacement (Ho et al. 2006) . This produces 189 pairs of control and treatment observations from the original sample of 529 conflict years, and 266 pairs of control and treatment observations from the original sample of 820 conflict dyad years.
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Our analysis of the matched dataset produces additional support for our hypothesis, as once again civilian defense forces produce a strong and significant effect in the hypothesized direction for all three forms of violence. This adds further support to our theoretical claims and helps to address confounding explanations related to endogeneity.
Case Analysis: Iraq
For a deeper assessment of our causal argument we undertake a Ômodel testingÕ case analysis (Lieberman 2005) . We focus on civilian defense forces in Anbar province, Iraq (2005 . Civilian defense militias formed here, and one of the regions in which they 20 For more information on matching see Ho et al. 2007; Lyall 2010. 21 Balance tests reveal that these pairs are closely matched, meeting or exceeding the standard for variance. For example, all variables receive a value of ≤ 0.25 for standardized bias (e.g. the difference in the means of the treated and control groups, divided by the standard deviation of the treated group); this is considered a Ògood matchÓ (Ho et al. 2007, 23fn15) .
were most active. It therefore represents an appropriate case to assess the internal validity of our argument.
Sunni Militias and Coalition Violence
In 2004 Information from the ÒawakenedÓ militias allowed Coalition forces to effectively focus their military firepower on insurgents, reducing civilian fatalities and increasing the effectiveness of the 2007 US troop surge (Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2012; Clayton and Thomson 2014: 929; Macdonald 2014: 212-214) . Figure I between January and September 2007 (Cordesman and Davies 2008: 522) .
Civilianizing the Iraq War
23
The only period in which insurgent kills were higher in Anbar province was the battle for Fallujah in
The formation of civilian defense groups also affected the targets of insurgent violence. According to military accounts, insurgents responded to the civilian defense forces by targeting tribal leaders and civilians who had made the switch (as well as those who were contemplating it) in attempts to punish them for their abdication and deter future defections (Finer and Nickmeyer 2005; Long 2008; Smith and Macfarland 2008: 49) .
This is supported by evidence on the number of insurgent attacks that produced at least one civilian death. As Figure 
Conflict Intensification
As an aggregate effect, the emergence of Sunni militias increased violence overall.
Evidence from the Iraq war logs illustrates the severity of the violence in this period. The total fatalities (e.g. coalition, civilian, and insurgent) grew quickly with the formation of In summary, the ÒawakenedÓ militias and Sons of Iraq were effective in locating insurgents. This helped the US military to effectively target insurgents, and reduced civilian fatalities. However, the militias provoked a response from insurgents, who retaliated against local communities in an attempt to punish defection and regain control. The Sunni realignment also caused defections and fragmentation within the insurgency, and drove a wedge between the local populations and the insurgents, intensifying the civil conflict but eventually choking the latter out of the area.
Conclusions
In this paper we argue that civilian defense forces are a unique type of progovernment militia and that such groups have specific effects on patterns of violence in civil war. We provide evidence to show that civilian defense forces decrease incumbentsÕ use of indiscriminate violence, but increase insurgent violence. We also demonstrate that by making civilians the center of the irregular war effort, civilian defense forces increase the overall fatalities in civil conflicts (at least in the short-run). This underscores the significance of civilian support and control in determining the type and level of violence in civil war (Kalyvas 2006) . Specifically, in accordance with existing research on one-sided violence against civilians, we find further evidence that actors tend to resort to indiscriminate violence where their level of control is weak (Downes 2008; Eck and Hultman 2007; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Linsay 2004; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2010; Zahar 2000) .
This paper contributes to the emerging body of literature centered on the effects of pro-government militias (Ahram 2011; Carey, Mitchell and Lowe 2013; Mitchell 2011, 2015; Peic 2014; Stanton 2015) . We offer one of the first systematic investigations into the effects that militias have on the dynamics of civil conflict. In doing so, we also develop further insight into different types of pro-government militias and why and how states make use of these differences. More generally, our arguments have implications for the understanding of insurgent group fragmentation (Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012; Driscoll 2012; Staniland 2014) . While previous research stresses ethnic divisions (Lyall 2010; Staniland 2012) , we highlight the importance of civilian support (passive and active) to insurgents in explaining insurgent in-fighting.
Finally, from a policy-making stand point this paper supports the established view that civilians in counterinsurgent roles can provide an effective strategy to separate the insurgents from the local population (Galula 1964; Jones 2012; McClintock 1992; Peic 2014 ). However, it opens significant normative questions given the effects that it is predicted to have on the dynamics and intensity of violence. From a more critical perspective, civilian defense forces are tantamount to a divide-and-rule-tactic, whereupon the delegation of security and coercion of civilians polarizes local relationships by forcing insurgents to respond to those that are now actively against them. Indeed, developing states often use civilian cleavages in this way to mute resistance to processes of state formation (Ahram 2011; Bakke 2015; Holden 2004; Thomson 1994; Tilly 2003) . Similarly, conquering powers have traditionally used local collaborators in this manner within broader social networks of domination, often to the detriment of local populations (Macdonald 2014) . Our findings therefore inform military debates on the effectiveness of civilian defense forces (Jones 2012) , and provide evidence to show that incumbent forces that wish to use such tactics in the future should consider the serious ethical issues involved in placing civilians at the center of violence. This is part of an interesting and understudied set of dynamics in the logic of violence in irregular wars. While we have revealed some significant insights into the effects of civilian mobilization into militia groups, further research is required to assess the effect of other types of militia groups.
